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This paper examines countries￿free-riding incentives in international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) when, ￿rst, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have
complete information about other countries￿noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model
whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own
noncompliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that
countries￿probability to join the IEA is increasing in the free-riding bene￿ts they can obtain
from other countries￿compliance, and decreasing in the cost of not complying with the initial
terms of the agreement. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough,
there is no equilibrium in which all countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, how-
ever, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common
observations in international negotiations.
Keywords: Signaling games, environmental agreements, nonbinding negotiations, noncom-
pliance cost.
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In recent years many industrialized nations have actively participated in numerous international
environmental agreements (IEAs henceforth) to address the issues related to environmental degra-
dation, from ozone layer depletion (in the Montreal protocol) to greenhouse gases (in the Kyoto
protocol). By entering in these environmental treaties, countries accept a commitment level about
how much they will invest in clean technologies, reduce pollutant emissions, etc. One important
characteristic of IEAs is that commitment levels are non-enforceable, since there is no international
organization which can perfectly enforce the content of the agreement. The non-binding nature of
these treaties makes them particularly interesting from a theoretical perspective, since most of the
negotiations analyzed by the literature on contract theory are binding and enforceable, such as in
bargaining models. In addition, they are attractive from an applied approach, given the signi￿cant
consequences that not implementing the agreements￿content have on the environmental quality of
the planet.
Because environmental treaties are non-enforceable, they cannot be treated as binding nego-
tiations since countries can deviate from the terms of the agreement. A country would do so if
complying with the full content of the agreement is too costly because of its own economic or politi-
cal context. Intuitively, countries￿political costs of not complying the treaty might be explained as
the incumbent political party being severely punished by environmentally oriented citizens (￿green
voters￿ ), whereas sticking to the terms of the agreement might be rewarded by these voters￿support
in future elections.1 Therefore, countries￿incentives to comply (or deviate from) the environmental
agreement can be analyzed as a strategic decision. We henceforth refer to the political cost of not
complying with the terms of the IEA as ￿noncompliance cost.￿
Furthermore, the signature of a speci￿c commitment level in the IEA is not a simultaneous
negotiation, but rather, the result of a long and sequential negotiation process.2 In addition, we
assume that countries do not have complete information about other countries￿noncompliance costs.
Because of this sequential structure, it is common that countries base their decision on whether
to join the IEA after observing if other countries joined the agreement as well. Particularly, a
country￿ s decision to join the agreement might reveal information about the country￿ s own political
cost from noncomplying the treaty in later stages, which ultimately a⁄ects other countries￿decision
on whether or not to sign the agreement.3
1For instance, the defeat of Australian Prime Minister John Howard in 2007 has been explained, among other
factors, by his noncompliance of climate change policies, i.e., Australia signed the Kyoto protocol in April 1998, but
neither rati￿ed it nor implemented its content. Alternatively, political costs can be understood as the deterioration in
the international image from the lack of compliance of the IEA. From an ethical perspective, the political cost can be
interpreted as the disappointment of the country￿ s voters with the politicians who were supposed to implement the
content of the treaty, since they lied both to their constituents and to the countries participating in the international
agreement.
2The Kyoto protocol, for instance, was open for signature March 16, 1998, but did not enter into force until
February 16, 2005.
3We assume that countries only have information about the probability distribution with which other country￿ sThis paper examines the negotiation and implementation of IEAs as a signaling game where,
￿rst, the country leading the negotiations decides to sign (or not sign) the agreement. Afterwards,
observing the leader￿ s decision, the other country (follower) decides whether to join the treaty.
Finally, both countries non-cooperatively and independently choose whether to comply with the
terms of the agreement (e.g., investing in clean technologies or reducing pollutant emissions). That
is, we analyze how the country￿ s signature of an international agreement can reveal information
about that country￿ s private political situation to other countries, and how this information might
a⁄ect other countries￿decision to join the treaty.
We ￿rst identify the investment in clean technologies that, in the equilibrium of the second stage
of the game, every country implements both when it joins the treaty and when it does not. We
show that the investment increases in the commitment level that a country signs in the agreement,
decreases in other countries￿commitment level, and increases in the political cost that the country
would su⁄er because of not ful￿lling the treaty.
Additionally, we identify conditions under which the follower (the second mover in this signaling
game) decides to join the IEA. We demonstrate that the follower decides to participate in the
agreement if the environmental bene￿ts arising from the IEA o⁄set the noncompliance cost of
deviating from the agreement. Speci￿cally, we show that a country￿ s decision to join the agreement
is more likely:
1. the higher the return from the improved environmental quality resulting from the treaty;
2. the lower the commitment level that the agreement speci￿es to the follower;
3. the higher the commitment level that the leading country signs in the IEA; and
4. the higher the probability that the leading country implements most of the commitments
agreed to in the treaty.
These four incentives, especially (3) and (4), emphasize the fact that the second mover￿ s decision
to participate in the IEA can be rationalized as a free-riding behavior. That is, a country is more
likely to join agreements in which other countries bear most of the burden of the investment in
clean technologies.
We show that the unique equilibrium of the game (involving the use of pure strategies) is that in
which the leading country signs the IEA when its noncompliance costs are low, but does not when
its costs are high, and the following country responds by not signing the treaty. This constitutes a
separating equilibrium in which the information about the country leading the negotiations is fully
noncompliance costs are high or low, but do not observe the actual realization of this random variable. In our setting,
this is equivalent to considering that countries know some information about other countries￿political scenario (e.g.,
from international news agencies), but are unaware of the speci￿cs of the actual political situation in that country.transmitted to the following country. We then strengthen our results by showing that this strategy
pro￿le can be supported as the unique equilibrium of the game for all parameter values and under
relatively general assumptions on the utility function. In addition, we demonstrate that our results
hold even when countries obtain a political bene￿t from the mere signature of the agreement, as
long as such bene￿t does not o⁄set the political cost from deviating from the treaty afterwards.
Finally, we provide an ￿optimistic￿result: our equilibrium predictions show that certain coun-
tries with high political costs might decide not to join a particular IEA but nonetheless invest
positive amounts in clean technologies (or reduce emissions) afterwards. This result would explain
the decision of countries like the United Kingdom and U.S.A. of not ratifying the Helsinki and
Kyoto protocols respectively, but subsequently complying with many of the environmental goals
included in these treaties.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the literature on international
agreements. Section two presents the model, and section three analyzes the second stage of the
game, when countries decide how much to invest in clean technologies. Section four analyzes
countries￿ incentives to join the agreement, and the unique equilibrium of the signaling game.
Section ￿ve extends the ￿ndings to more general utility functions and parameter values. Section
six concludes and provides a discussion about our results.
1.1 Related literature
In recent years, many authors have analyzed the negotiation stage of di⁄erent IEAs using the theory
of repeated games; see Barrett (1994a, 1994b, 1999), Cesar (1994), and Rubio and Ulph (2007).
This literature considers that a country individually decides to join an international agreement if the
bene￿ts that it obtains from fully implementing the agreement outweigh the costs.4 However, they
assume that signatory countries comply the terms of the IEA. In contrast, this paper allows for the
possibility of noncompliance, bringing our model and results closer to countries￿observed behavior
after signing certain international agreements in an incomplete information context.5 Speci￿cally,
our ￿ndings predict the non-signature of the agreement by countries with high noncompliance costs.
Hence, our results provide an explanation for countries￿hesitation to participate in nonbinding IEAs
such as the Kyoto protocol. Similar to the existing literature, our model identi￿es the existence of
free-riding incentives in the negotiation stage of the agreement. However, this free-riding result is
explained by countries￿political cost of deviating from the content of the treaty.
4This literature was complemented by other class of models in which countries were assumed to exhibit a preference
for ￿international equality￿ , Lange and Vogt (2003) and Hoel and Schneider (1997), by introducing the possibility that
international negotiations impose sanctions on ￿defecting￿countries, Barret (1992, 1994a), or to link the negotiations
of transboundary pollution with other issues such as free-trade agreements, Carraro and Siniscalco (2001), Whalley
(1991) and Folmer et al (1993).
5Chayes and Chayes (1995) also recognize that noncompliance exists, but they explain it by relying on uncontrol-
lable social or economic changes a⁄ecting the signatory country. Our paper adds to this explanation for noncompliance
the fact that countries can deviate from the terms of the agreement as long as it is politically bene￿cial for them.Some studies have introduced incomplete information in environmental games. In particular,
Bac (1996) develops a two country dynamic game where countries do not know each others￿en-
vironmental valuations. He assumes that both countries simultaneously decide their abatement
decisions, not allowing for the transmission of information in signaling games, and considering that
countries￿payo⁄ structure is strategically equivalent to a ￿chicken game￿ , unlike most literature
on IEAs. Brandt (2004), in contrast, develops a signaling game where countries￿incentives resem-
ble those in a prisoner￿ s dilemma game. Like these papers, we investigate countries￿incentives to
participate in IEAs under incomplete information. However, our model allows countries to deviate
from their terms of the treaty.
Recent literature has approached the negotiation stage of international agreements ￿ not only of
environmental nature but also with political or economic content￿introducing the assumption that
countries are incompletely informed about each others￿internal situation. For instance, Iida (1993)
formalized Putman￿ s (1988) model of international negotiations. In particular, Iida (1993) considers
a repeated bargaining game in which countries do not have information about each others￿domestic
situation, and are allowed to make o⁄ers and countero⁄ers. Importantly, this paper assumes that
once an o⁄er has been agreed upon (signature of the treaty), both countries fully implement its
content. As aforementioned, IEAs are rarely binding, which implies that the relative ful￿llment of
an agreement should be an equilibrium result rather than an assumption of the model. Morrow
(1991) uses a similar approach as Iida (1993), but applies his model to the particular case of USA-
Soviet Union negotiations under incomplete information.6 This model focuses only on the bene￿ts
or costs that politicians can obtain from signing international agreements (as if the signature had
a per se value), but is silent to the political bene￿ts or costs from complying the terms of the
agreement (or deviating from it). We introduce both types of incentives in our model. Finally,
Bagwell (2009) develops a repeated game where countries sign a tari⁄ agreement which can be
weakly binding, under incomplete information among countries. Countries su⁄er a political cost
from setting the low tari⁄s speci￿ed in the treaty, unlike our model where countries bene￿t from
complying the treaty.
2 Model
We represent the signature and implementation of an IEA as a two-stage game. For simplicity, we
assume that the IEA is being negotiated by two countries (country i and j). The ￿rst stage of the
game, the ￿negotiation stage,￿is a signaling game where country i announces its participation in
the IEA, given a particular non-binding commitment towards the investment in emission-reducing
technologies, ci, determined by an international agency, such as the United Nations￿ Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change. Conditional on this announcement, country j responds by
6He introduces incomplete information in the signing stage, since the USA does not know the reservation value of
the Soviet Union if the latter were to break the negotiations. Additionally, he assumes that the incumbent politician
in the USA can improve his probabilities of being reelected if he signs a treaty with the Soviet Union.determining its participation in the IEA, for a given commitment level7, cj. In the second stage
of the game, referred to as the investment game, countries simultaneously choose their investment
level in clean technology. In particular, the time structure of the game is the following:
1. Nature selects country i￿ s political cost from not ful￿lling the agreement, ￿i ￿ 0, which is
privately observed by country i but not by j. For simplicity, we assume that the political cost
is either high (￿i = 1) or low (￿i = 0), with associated probabilities p and 1￿p, respectively.
2. After observing its own political cost, country i announces its participation in the IEA, for a
given non-binding commitment level ci.
3. After observing whether country i participates in the agreement, country j decides its signa-
ture of the treaty, for a given commitment level cj, given its posterior beliefs about country
i￿ s political cost. We assume that country j￿ s political cost is high, ￿j = 1, which is common
knowledge among the players.8 Furthermore, we assume that country j￿ s non-signature of
the agreement implies that the IEA is not implemented. (We relax both assumptions in the
last section of the paper, where we extend our results to all parameter values for both the
leader and the follower, and to general utility functions).
4. If both countries participate in the IEA, they play a simultaneous-move game in which they
determine the investment levels in emission-reducing technologies, xi and xj, that are ￿nally
implemented. If either country does not sign the treaty, commitment levels are ci = cj = 0,
and countries select investment levels xi and xj accordingly.
Let ￿(HjS) and ￿(HjNS) denote country j￿ s posterior beliefs about country i￿ s high political
cost of deviating from the treaty after observing that country i signed the IEA or that it did not,
respectively. Moreover, assume that country i￿ s utility function is represented by the following
quasilinear utility function,
ui(xi;xj;ci) = w ￿ xi + ln[m(xi + xj) + ￿i (xi ￿ ci)] (1)
In particular, the ￿rst term, w ￿ xi, represents the utility derived from the consumption of
the remaining monetary units that are not invested in clean technologies, i.e., not invested in
the public good. In the second term, m represents the return from the environmental good and
m(xi + xj) denotes the total return that country i obtains from the consumption of a higher level
of environmental quality given its own investments, xi, and the ones of country j, xj. Finally,
￿i (xi ￿ ci) represents the return that country i derives from relatively ful￿lling its commitment
ci in the environmental agreement or the cost that it incurs from noncomplying the agreement.
Intuitively, an increase in country i￿ s investment, xi, has a traditional public good dimension, via
m(xi + xj), and an additional ful￿llment dimension, via ￿i (xi ￿ ci).
7Similar to Gilligan (2004) countries can also select di⁄erent commitments levels in our model, ci 6= cj.
8Common knowledge about ￿j can be rationalized when the follower is a country with a long history negotiating
IEAs, while the leader is a country with a relatively short history as an IEA negotiator.3 Equilibrium investments
We ￿rst obtain both countries￿equilibrium investments in the second stage of the game using
backward induction, for any pro￿le of commitment levels signed during the ￿rst stage of the game
(which we discuss below), and for any pro￿le of political costs (￿i;￿j), from Espinola-Arredondo
(2009).








m+￿i if ￿i > ^ ￿i(￿j)
￿i(1+ci)(￿j+m)￿￿jmcj
￿jm+￿i(￿j+m) if ￿i 2 (￿ ￿i(￿j); ^ ￿i(￿j)]
0 if ￿i 2 (0; ￿ ￿i(￿j)]
(2)
where ^ ￿i(￿j) =
mcj+￿j(1+cj)(m+cj)
(1+ci)m and ￿ ￿i(￿j) =
￿jcjm
(1+ci)(￿j+m).
In particular, country i￿ s investment in clean technologies is at its maximum level when its
concern about green voters, ￿i, is su¢ ciently high, i.e., ￿i > ^ ￿i(￿j). When the importance that
country i assigns to green voters decreases below ^ ￿i(￿j) its optimal investment also decreases, as the
above lemma shows. That is, country i is not highly concerned about its own relative ful￿llment of
the IEA because it does not perceive the group of green voters as being relevant in future elections.
Finally, if ￿i drops below the threshold ￿ ￿i(￿j), then its concerns about green voters￿punishment
are not strong enough to support any positive investment in clean technologies.9
4 Negotiation stage
Let us ￿rst examine country j￿ s incentives to participate in the IEA after observing that country i
did not sign the agreement.
Lemma 2. If country i does not sign the IEA, country j will not sign the agreement, for
any commitment level included in the IEA, and for any probability distribution over country i￿ s
noncompliance cost.
In order to analyze the results in lemma 2, let us identify country j￿ s costs and bene￿ts of signing
the IEA. On the one hand, country j￿ s costs are political. That is, country j￿ s noncompliance of the
environmental agreement is punished by its voters in future elections. On the other hand, country
j￿ s bene￿ts of participating in the IEA are related to the improvement in the global environmental
quality due to its investment in clean technologies in the second stage of the game. However, in
this case country i does not sign the IEA, which implies that the bene￿ts arising from the treaty
9Note that when voters do not care about deviations from the commitment levels included in the IEA, ￿i = ￿j = 0,
countries￿participation in the IEA would act as cheap talk.are mainly due to country j￿ s own investments. In this situation the political costs of deviating
from the terms of the agreement dominate the environmental bene￿ts resulting from country j￿ s
investment. As a consequence, country j does not sign the IEA after observing that country i did
not sign the agreement.
In contrast, when country i decides to participate in the IEA, country j￿ s decision depends on
the speci￿c costs and bene￿ts from the agreement, as the following lemma describes.
Lemma 3. If country i signs the IEA, then country j also signs it if and only if
1. p >
cj
cj(ci;m), when all types of country i sign the IEA, or
2. ￿(HjS) >
cj
cj(ci;m), when all types of country i do not sign the IEA, or
3. cj ￿ cj(ci;m), when country i signs the IEA if and only if its political costs of reneging from
the IEA are high, where cj(ci;m) = (1 + m)
￿
ln[1 + 2m + mci
1+m] ￿ ln[1 + 2m]
￿
.
Intuitively, country j￿ s costs of participating in the environmental agreement are still purely
political, as discussed above. However, the environmental bene￿ts of signing the IEA (improved
environmental quality) are higher: country i signs the treaty for a given commitment level ci,
which might be implemented. Indeed, the environmental bene￿ts of participating in the treaty are
increasing in the probability that country i￿ s political cost of deviating from the terms of the IEA
is high, and in the commitment level that country i signs, ci.
The environmental bene￿ts that lead country j to participate in the IEA are also increasing
in the return from an improvement in the environmental quality, m, re￿ ecting the incentives to
free-ride on country i￿ s investment in clean technologies. In other words, country j￿ s participation
in the IEA can be supported for a larger set of parameter values, fci;cj;pg, and beliefs ￿(HjS)
and ￿(HjNS), the higher is the return from the global public good (improved world environmental
quality). Finally, this set of parameter values inducing country j to sign the agreement becomes
larger as cj, the commitment level that the IEA speci￿es for country j, decreases. Intuitively, the
lower is cj the lower are country j￿ s political costs of deviating from the agreement, which allows
for more parameter combinations where country j￿ s environmental bene￿ts of signing the IEA are
higher than its political costs. That is, a decrease in cj strengthens country j￿ s free-riding bene￿ts
from participating in the IEA.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the set of parameter values supporting country j￿ s participation in
the IEA, where the level set cj = cj(ci;m) represents parameter values for which country j is
indi⁄erent between signing and not signing the treaty. Pairs of commitment levels (ci;cj) such that
cj < cj(ci;m), on the left hand side of the level set, illustrate IEAs that are signed by country j
(its environmental bene￿ts outweigh its political costs), while those commitment levels satisfying
cj > cj(ci;m), on the right hand side of the level set, represent IEAs in which country j would not
participate.Commitment levels supporting participation in IEAs
Figure 1. Level set cj = p ￿ cj(ci;m) for
p = 0:9 (solid), and p = 0:7 (dashed).
Figure 2. Level set cj = cj(ci;m) for m = 0:3
(solid), and m = 0:8 (dashed).
In the case that country j cannot infer country i￿ s type, the above level set is weighted by the
probability that country i￿ s commitment levels are likely to be implemented (the probability, p,
that country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high). The uncertainty about country i￿ s type reduces
country j￿ s incentives to participate in the IEA. Figure 1 represents this e⁄ect by a leftward shift
in level set cj = cj(ci;m), which ultimately shrinks the set of commitment levels (ci;cj) for which
country j accepts to participate in the environmental agreement. Finally, an increase in the return
from the improved environmental quality, m, increases country j￿ s incentives to free-ride on country
i￿ s investments during the second stage of the game, inducing the former to accept a larger variety
of commitment levels. Figure 2 illustrates how increases in m provoke a rightward shift in the
level set, enlarging the set of commitment levels for which country j decides to participate in the
international agreement.
Other implication from the previous result is that the set of parameter values for which country
j accepts to participate in the IEA is above the 450￿line where ci = cj. Intuitively, this implies
that country j only signs an IEA if the commitment level suggested by the international agency,
cj, is lower than that recommended to country i, ci, regardless of the return from the improvement
in the global environmental quality resulting from the treaty.
4.1 Country i￿ s equilibrium strategy
As shown in the previous sections, country j￿ s incentives to participate in the IEA increase when
its commitment level is low (since this reduces its political costs) and country i￿ s commitment level
is high (since this increases country j￿ s environmental bene￿ts from the improved environmentalquality, i.e., free-riding). This result also applies to country i, the ￿rst mover in the signaling game,
when country i is highly concerned about its political costs. Speci￿cally, when it faces high political
costs of deviating from the content of the IEA, country i would only be willing to participate in
IEAs if it can bene￿t from large investments in clean technologies from country j (i.e., if free-riding
incentives are strong enough), as the following lemma describes.
Lemma 4. When country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high, country i signs the IEA if and
only if ci < ci(cj;m). In contrast, if its noncompliance costs are low, country i participates in the
IEA for any parameter values.
On the one hand, when country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high, country i signs if the environ-
mental bene￿ts arising from the implementation of the IEA during the second stage of the game
o⁄set the political costs. Importantly, country i￿ s bene￿ts from the IEA, as we mentioned before,
are: (1) increasing in the other country￿ s commitment level included in the IEA, cj; (2) increasing
in the return from the investment in clean technologies (return from the global public good, m); and
(3) decreasing in the commitment level that the IEA speci￿es for country i. Intuitively, the above
three points can be jointly interpreted as country i￿ s incentives to free-ride country j￿ s investment
in clean technologies.10
On the other hand, when country i faces a low political cost, it would be willing to participate in
any type of IEA, i.e., for any parameter values ci, cj and m. Indeed, note that country i￿ s bene￿ts
from signing the IEA are still arising from the improved environmental quality. This higher quality,
nonetheless, is only due to country j￿ s investment in clean technologies, since country i￿ s optimal
investment is zero during the second stage of the game.
The latter result has signi￿cant implications in our search for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE)
of this signaling game. Indeed, it speci￿es that country i chooses to sign the IEA when its political
costs are low, for any parameter values.11 This implies that we only need to consider two possible
PBE in pure strategies: the pooling PBE in which both types of country i decide to participate
in the IEA; and the separating PBE in which the low concerned country signs, whereas the highly
concerned country does not. We next show that one of these strategy pro￿les cannot be supported
in equilibrium.
10Note that countries￿investment levels are strategic substitutes, i.e., an increase in xi reduces country j￿ s incentives
to raise xj, for any i 6= j. Furthermore, recall that countries prefer to participate in IEAs that specify low commitment
levels for themselves but high for other countries. This strategic setting would correspond to the ￿Lean and Hungry
Look￿ case in Fudenberg and Tirole￿ s (1984) taxonomy about the e⁄ect of strategic pre-commitment on ￿rms￿
competition.
11This result is applicable to the case of strategy pro￿les supported as PBE if we restrict our attention to degenerated
(pure) strategies. However, when we allow for countries to randomize between signing and not signing (in the
semiseparating equilibrium of the game), we show that country i may decide not to sign the IEA, regardless of its
political costs (see Appendix).Lemma 5. The pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types of country i sign the IEA, regardless
of their political costs, cannot be supported as a pure-strategy PBE of the environmental signaling
game if cj < p ￿ cj(ci;m).
In a pooling strategy pro￿le both types of country i would choose to sign the treaty. In this
case, country j cannot update its beliefs about country i￿ s type, and hence decides to join the IEA
if and only if cj < p￿cj(ci;m), where p denotes the prior probability that country i￿ s political costs
are high. However, this condition implies that country i would have to bear most of the burden of
the treaty, leading it to not sign the agreement when its political costs are high, as shown in lemma
5.12 This leaves the separating strategy pro￿le as the unique PBE of this signaling game involving
pure strategies, as the following proposition describes.
Proposition 1. In the IEA signaling game, the following separating strategy pro￿le can be
supported as the unique PBE in pure strategies:
1. Country i signs the IEA when its political costs are low, but does not sign when its political
costs are high, for any parameter values.
2. Country j responds by not signing the IEA, both after observing that country i signs and does
not sign the agreement, for any parameter values, given that country j￿ s posterior beliefs are
￿(HjS) = 0 and ￿(HjNS) = 1.
Intuitively, this is a strategy pro￿le in which country i￿ s private information about its political
costs is perfectly transmitted to country j. Particularly, when observing that country i signed
the IEA, country j￿ s beliefs assign full probability to country i having low political costs, whereas
country i not signing the IEA reveals that country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high.13 Hence,
country j knows that any positive commitment level comes from a country which will not be
politically motivated to comply it. In turn, this eliminates country j￿ s environmental bene￿t from
participating in the IEA (i.e., the improved environmental quality that country j free-rides from
country i￿ s investment in clean technologies). Therefore, country j decides to not participate in the
IEA for any parameter values.
Regarding the leader, the former proposition states that country i anticipates that country j
will not sign the IEA, which reduces country i￿ s environmental bene￿t from free-riding country j￿ s
investment in clean technologies. As a consequence, country i decides not to sign the IEA when
its political costs are high. (Recall that, despite not participating in IEAs, countries might invest
12In contrast, when cj > p ￿ cj(ci;m) holds country j does not participate in the IEA, regardless of country i￿ s
previous decision, which leads country i to be indi⁄erent between signing and not signing the agreement when its
own political costs are high. We analyze this mixed strategy pro￿le as one special case of all mixed strategy pro￿les
that can be supported as PBEs of this signaling game (see Appendix).
13Note that such separating equilibrium, in which information is fully transmitted, coincides with the subgame
perfect equilibrium where countries are informed about each other￿ s political costs.positive amounts in clean technologies). In contrast, when its political costs are low, country i signs
the IEA for any parameter values (lemma 4). Therefore, country i participates in the IEA if and
only if its noncompliance costs are low.14
4.2 Discussion and applications
The results obtained in the previous section can illustrate usual negotiation patterns in IEAs.
Indeed, countries with high political costs announce that they would only sign a high commitment
level in the IEA (as the ￿rst movers in our signaling game) if other countries sign high commitment
levels as well. However, as we just showed, countries with high political costs (both when they
act as ￿rst and second movers) only accept to participate in the IEA if they can strongly bene￿t
from other country￿ s investment in clean technology during the second stage of the game (free-
riding incentives). When both ￿rst and second mover countries bear high political costs, free-riding
incentives are specially strong, inducing each country to only sign the IEA if the other country￿ s
commitment level is su¢ ciently high, relative to its own. Since this cannot simultaneously occur,
both countries do not sign the IEA. Thus, the ￿rst mover￿ s o⁄er ￿I sign high commitment levels
and you then sign high commitment levels as well￿ , can be understood as a void proposal in
equilibrium. The free-riding incentives can, however, be reduced by increasing countries￿return
from the environmental quality, m. This can be achieved through transfers of clean technology
between countries ￿ which reduce the investment cost for the bene￿ting country￿ or promoting
policies that increase citizens￿preference for renewable energies. In our model, both measures would
expand the set of parameter values for which countries decide to participate in the agreement..
Our results show that, under incomplete information and political costs, countries do not par-
ticipate in IEAs for any pair of commitment levels (ci;cj), including those that a central planner
would select in order to maximize social welfare. Nonetheless, our model predicts that countries￿
decentralized investment in clean technology during the second stage of the game is positive, sug-
gesting that countries can still partially achieve their environmental goals despite not participating
in IEAs.
Finally, our results can provide an interpretation about the relationship between the di¢ culty
to monitor the compliance of certain IEAs and countries￿observed behavior. Speci￿cally, we could
interpret countries￿noncompliance costs in broader terms: including both the country￿ s speci￿c
deviation from the environmental agreement and the probability that such deviation is detected
(or perceived) by environmental agencies, NGOs and political parties running for o¢ ce. Those
IEAs that are particularly di¢ cult to monitor are represented in our model by a reduction in the
political costs that a signing country bears if it deviates from the terms of the agreement (lower
14The introduction of more potential participants in the IEA would not substantially modify our results as long as
information from the informed country (leader) to the uninformed country (follower) is perfectly transmitted in the
￿rst stage of the game, as shown in Proposition 1.￿￿ s). As described above, countries with low political costs will be willing to participate in IEAs,
since the environmental bene￿ts o⁄set their (low) noncompliance costs.
5 Equilibria under general utility functions
In this section we extend the result obtained in proposition 1 to more general utility functions for
country i and j. We show that the separating strategy pro￿le in which country i participates in
the IEA (when its noncompliance cost is low) is still the unique PBE of the signaling game for any
parameter values, under relatively general conditions.
Let us denote by U(ci;cj;￿K) country i￿ s equilibrium payo⁄ from the second stage of the game
(after including the equilibrium investment in clean technologies from both countries), where ci
and cj denote, respectively, country i and j￿ s commitment levels in the IEA, and ￿K represents
country i￿ s noncompliance costs where K = fH;Lg. When country i￿ s noncompliance costs are
high, we assume that U(￿) is weakly decreasing in its own commitment level, ci, for any given
commitment level of country j, i.e., U(ci;cj;￿H) ￿ U(c0
i;cj;￿H) for any ci < c0
i. In contrast, when
its noncompliance costs are low, U(￿) is constant in ci, for any given commitment level of country
j, i.e., U(ci;cj;￿L) = U(c0
i;cj;￿L) for any ci < c0
i, since country i can deviate from the terms of the
treaty without experiencing any political costs. Note that the above speci￿cation allows countries
to obtain a bene￿t from the mere signature of the agreement. In particular, this bene￿t can arise
in certain environmental agreements in which the country￿ s participation produces a political gain
because of an improved public image. Nonetheless, we consider that such bene￿t does not o⁄set the
political cost from deviating, and hence the above conditions still hold. Note that if, in contrast,
the bene￿ts from the mere signature of the IEA exceed the political cost from not complying the
treaty, then countries would participate in the environmental agreement both when their political
costs are low and high, supporting a pooling equilibrium in this game
Regarding country j, let V (ci;cj;￿K) represent its equilibrium payo⁄ from the second stage of
the game. Like in the case of country i, let us assume that V (￿) is weakly decreasing in country
j￿ s commitment level cj, for a given commitment level of country i, and for any noncompliance
cost of country i, i.e., V (ci;cj;￿K) ￿ V (ci;c0
j;￿K) for any cj < c0
j. Finally, we assume that both
countries￿equilibrium payo⁄ weakly increases in the other country￿ s commitment level. In the
following proposition we show that, under the stated conditions, the unique PBE of the signaling
game using pure strategies is that in which the leader participates in the IEA if and only if its
noncompliance costs are low.Proposition 2. Assume the above conditions about the leader and the follower￿ s second-period
equilibrium payo⁄s. Then, in the IEA signaling game, the following (separating) strategy pro￿le
can be supported as the unique PBE in pure strategies:
1. Country i signs the IEA when its political costs are low, but does not sign when its political
costs are high, for any parameter values.
2. Country j responds by not signing the IEA both after observing that country i signs and does
not sign the agreement, for any parameter values, given that country j￿ s posterior beliefs are
￿(HjS) = 0 and ￿(HjNS) = 1.
It is important to note the generality of the previous result. First, we assume that countries￿
equilibrium payo⁄ weakly increases in each other￿ s commitment levels (because of the environmen-
tal bene￿ts that every country obtains free-riding other countries￿investment in clean technologies),
and weakly decreases in its commitment level (because of the noncompliance costs). As a conse-
quence, we show that the separating equilibrium is the unique PBE in pure strategies: (1) for
relatively general utility functions15; (2) for any noncompliance costs for country i and j (i.e., ￿i
and ￿j do not need to take particular values); (3) without the need to grant veto power to any of
the countries involved in the negotiation of the IEA; and (4) even if countries partially bene￿t from
the mere participation in the treaty. Our results can then be used to analyze a variety of national
and international agreements whose content cannot be perfectly enforced.
6 Conclusions
This paper examines countries￿relative ful￿llment of international environmental agreements (IEAs)
when, ￿rst, the treaty is non-binding (lack of international organizations enforcing the terms of the
agreement), and second, countries do not have complete information about how likely it is that
other countries will stick to the terms of the agreement (or substantially deviate from it). We in-
troduce the latter assumption by considering that countries experience a noncompliance cost, and
that this cost is their own private information. We then construct a signaling model in which the
country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its noncompliance cost
through its decision to accept certain commitment levels to be included in the IEA.
The paper ￿rst shows that countries￿con￿ ict of interest in this signaling game is especially
strong. Indeed, every country decides to sign the agreement if the other country bears most of
the burden of the treaty, if the return from the improved environmental quality is high enough,
and if the probability that the other country will comply with its share of the treaty is high, or
a combination of these three incentives. As we demonstrate, all these behavioral patterns can be
rationalized from a free-riding perspective, since every country wants to bene￿t from the improved
15Note that we do not impose linearity or separability on either country￿ s utility function.environmental quality arising from the agreement, but only if the investment is mostly carried out
by other countries. We also show that such conditions guaranteeing the participation of every
country in the treaty cannot be satis￿ed for both countries simultaneously (i.e., both countries will
not join the IEA, under any parameter values).
As a result of the strong free-riding incentives, we show that the unique strategy pro￿le that can
be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a separating equilibrium, whereby
information is perfectly transmitted from informed to uninformed countries. In particular, in this
separating equilibrium the leading country in the negotiations signs the agreement only when its
own political costs are low, and the following country does not sign the treaty for any parameter
values. Note that our results are related to international agreements where western European
countries leading the negotiations proposed a high reduction in their pollutant emissions, expecting
other countries to join the agreement. As predicted by our equilibrium results, however, no other
western country responded to such proposal by joining the IEA.
The paper raises two main implications. From a policy perspective, and despite the last (nega-
tive) result about countries￿lack of participation in IEA, we show that many of the countries who
decide to not join the treaty actually invest positive amounts in clean technologies, reduce their pol-
lutant emissions, etc. This is a positive result, and it is supported by the fact that several countries
decide to invest in clean technologies despite their no participation in environmental treaties. Our
result then helps to separate the commitment levels included in environmental agreements and their
actual implementation, a common assumption in most of the literature on public and environmental
economics. From a more theoretical approach, our results imply that when players (e.g., countries)
negotiate non-binding contracts with incomplete information and with high competitive pressures
(strong free-riding incentives), the unique strategy pro￿le that can be supported as an equilibrium
of the game is that in which players participate in the agreement only when its noncompliance costs
are low. This is a powerful implication for other types of international agreements. Speci￿cally,
it suggests that in order to promote multiple cosignatories in IEAs, the most e⁄ective tool is to
reduce countries￿free-riding incentives arising during the subsequent implementation stage. More
theoretical research is nonetheless needed in order to better understand the connection between
non-binding international agreements and their latter implementation.7 Appendix
7.1 Semiseparating equilibria
We know that when cj ￿ p ￿ cj(ci;m), country j does not participate in the IEA, regardless of
country i￿ s decision. Graphically, this condition is represented by the area to the right of the level
set cj = p ￿ cj(ci;m) in Figure 1. Indeed, parameter values in such region imply that either: (1)
the commitment level for country j, cj, is relatively high; or (2) the probability that country i will
comply with the agreement, p, is low; or (3) the global environmental bene￿ts from the treaty, m,
are relatively low. Any combination of these three incentives induces country j to not participate
in the treaty, even after observing that country i did. The leader (country i) is now nevertheless
more willing to participate in the treaty, since the IEA speci￿es low commitment levels for country
i (graphically represented by pairs to the right of the level set). As we summarize in the next
result, the leader is now induced to randomize between signing and not signing the IEA, whereas
the follower never participates, as suggested above.
Semiseparating equilibria. In the IEA signaling game, the following strategy pro￿le can be
supported as a semiseparating PBE:
1. When country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high, country i signs the treaty with probability
qH =
cj
(m ￿ 1)p ￿ e cj(ci;m)
(3)
where e ci(cj;m) = log(1 + 2m) ￿ log
￿
1 + 2m + mci
1+m
￿
, and when country i￿ s noncompliance
costs are low, country i signs the treaty with probability
qL = (1 ￿ p) +
(1 ￿ p)cj
(1 + m)e cj(ci;m)
(4)
2. Country j responds by not signing the IEA, regardless of country i￿ s decision.
Proof. Let us start with country j. After observing that country i signs, country j randomizes



















pqH + (1 ￿ p)qL
￿
V (ci;0;￿L)
where V (ci;cj;￿K) denotes country j￿ s utility level from country i and j￿ s commitment level, when
country j￿ s belief about country i￿ s noncompliance cost is ￿K where ￿K = f￿H;￿Lg, and evaluated




p((1 + m) e cj(ci;m) + cj)where e cj(ci;m) = log(1 + 2m) ￿ log
￿
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￿
. After observing that country i did not sign,
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Solving for qH and qL simultaneously,
qH =
cj
(m ￿ 1)p ￿ e cj(ci;m)
and qL = (1 ￿ p) +
(1 ￿ p)cj
(1 + m)e cj(ci;m)
On the other hand, country i randomizes between signing and not signing the treaty when its
noncompliance costs are high if and only if
r ￿ U(ci;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ r)U(ci;0;￿H) = s ￿ U(0;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ s)U(0;0;￿H) (5)
where r (s) refers to the probability that country j participates in the IEA after observing that
country i signed (not signed, respectively) the treaty, and U(ci;cj;￿K) denotes country i￿ s utility
level from country i and j￿ s commitment level, when country i￿ s noncompliance cost is ￿K where
￿K = f￿H;￿Lg, and evaluated at the optimal investment level found in lemma 1. Solving for r,
r(s) =
((1 + m)s ￿ e cj(ci;m))
(1 + m) e cj(ci;m) + ci
And when country i￿ s noncompliance costs are low, country i randomizes between signing and not
signing if and only if
r ￿ U(ci;cj;￿L) + (1 ￿ r)U(ci;0;￿L) = s ￿ U(0;cj;￿L) + (1 ￿ s)U(0;0;￿L)
Solving for r and s simultaneously we obtain r = 0 and s = 0. Hence, country j does not sign after
observing that country i signed (r = 0) or after observing that country i did not sign (s = 0). ￿
7.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Both players simultaneously submit their investments in emission-reducing technologies. Fixing
country j￿ s investment, xj, country i￿ s utility maximization problem becomesmax
xi
w ￿ xi + ln[m(xi + xj) + ￿i (xi ￿ ci)]







m+￿i￿ici if xj = 0
1 + 1






0 if xj >
￿i(1+ci)+m
m
Since 1 + 1
m+￿i [￿ici ￿ mxj] = 0 exactly at xj =
￿i(1+ci)+m
m . Hence, this best response function










0 if xj >
￿i(1+ci)+m
m
Let us analyze the di⁄erent forms in which country i and j￿ s best response functions can cross
each other. The corner solutions are illustrated in the following ￿gures (cases 1 and 2 below), to












































































































i = 0 if and only the following two conditions are satis￿ed: (1) the horizontal
intercept of country i￿ s best response function is lower than that of country j, and (2) the slope of
country j￿ s best response function is small enough to make that xj(xi) does not cross xi(xj). That






+ 1Manipulating this inequality, we obtain
￿i <
￿jcjm
(1 + ci)(￿j + m)
￿ ￿i(￿j) (A.1)
On the other hand, the second condition holds if, b, the slope of country j￿ s best response
function, satis￿es








[m + ￿j(1 + cj)][m + ￿i]
[m + ￿i(1 + ci)][m + ￿j]
and since the slope of xj(xi) is m




[m + ￿j(1 + cj)][m + ￿i]
[m + ￿i(1 + ci)][m + ￿j]
[m + ￿i(1 + ci)][m + ￿j]m < [m + ￿j(1 + cj)][m + ￿i][m + ￿j]
and manipulating, and solving for ￿i, we obtain the threshold of ￿i below which all values of ￿i
support a zero investment in clean technologies by country i,
￿i ￿
mcj + ￿j(1 + cj)(m + cj)
(1 + ci)m
￿ b ￿i(￿j) (A.2)
where ￿i(￿j) < b ￿i(￿j), which implies that A.1 is more restrictive than A.2.
Case 2: x￿
i = 1 + ￿ici
m+￿i
Let us now analyze the case in which country i sets the maximum investment (1+ ￿ici
m+￿i) , while
country j does not invest. Firstly, we need that country i￿ s horizontal intercept is above that of






+ 1 () ￿i > ￿ ￿i(￿j)
Secondly, we need that b, the slope of country j￿ s best response function, satis￿es







and operating similarly as in the previous case, we have ￿i > ^ ￿i(￿j) And since ￿i(￿j) < b ￿i(￿j),











+ 1 () ￿i < ￿ ￿i(￿j)
and second, when b, the slope of country j￿ s best response function, satis￿es
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m+￿i if ￿i > ^ ￿i(￿j)
￿i(1+ci)(￿j+m)￿￿jmcj
￿jm+￿i(￿j+m) if ￿i 2 (￿ ￿i(￿j); ^ ￿i(￿j)]
0 if ￿i 2 (0; ￿ ￿i(￿j)]
where ^ ￿i(￿j) =
mcj+￿j(1+cj)(m+cj)
(1+ci)m and ￿ ￿i(￿j) =
￿jcjm
(1+ci)(￿j+m). ￿
7.3 Proof of Lemma 2
If country j observes that country i signs a zero commitment level, then country j participates in
the environmental agreement if and only if
￿(HjNS)V (0;cj;￿H)+(1 ￿ ￿(HjNS))V (0;cj;￿L) ￿ ￿(HjNS)V (0;0;￿H)+(1 ￿ ￿(HjNS))V (0;0;￿L)
where V (ci;cj;￿K) denotes country j￿ s second-period equilibrium utility level from country i and
j￿ s commitment levels, when country i￿ s type is ￿ 2 f￿H;￿Lg, and evaluated at the optimal
investment level we found in lemma 1. This inequality holds only for cj ￿ 0. Given that cj > 0
by de￿nition, then country j does not sign after observing no sign. Since this result does not
depend on country j￿ s beliefs about country i￿ s political costs being high, ￿(HjNS), then we can
conclude that country j does not sign the agreement after observing that country i did not, for any
probability distribution about country i￿ s noncompliance costs. ￿
7.4 Proof of Lemma 3
When both types of country i sign a positive commitment level, country j participates in the
agreement after observing that country i signs (on the equilibrium path) if and only if
p ￿ V (ci;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ p ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L)
which holds if and only if p ￿
cj




1 + 2m + mci
1+m
i
￿ log[1 + 2m]
￿
.
Similarly, when no type of country i participates in the international agreement, and country j ob-
serves the (o⁄-the-equilibrium) action in which country i signs the treaty, then country j participatesin the agreement if and only if
￿(HjS)￿V (ci;cj;￿H)+(1 ￿ ￿(HjS))￿V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ ￿(HjS)￿V (ci;0;￿H)+(1 ￿ ￿(HjS))￿V (ci;0;￿L)
That is, if ￿(HjS) ￿
cj
cj(ci;m). When country j believes that country i signs the treaty only when
its noncompliance costs are high, i.e., ￿(HjS) = 1 and ￿(HjNS) = 0, then country j signs after
observing the signature of country i if and only if V (ci;cj;￿H) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H), that is, if cj ￿
cj (ci;m). Finally, if country j believes that country i signs the IEA only when its noncompliance
costs are low, i.e., ￿(HjS) = 0 and ￿(HjNS) = 1, then country j signs after observing that country
i signs the agreement if and only if V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L), that is, if cj ￿ 0, i.e., country j
does not participate in the treaty for any parameter values. ￿
7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
High noncompliance costs. Let us consider the case in which the high type signs the treaty. In this
case country i signs if and only if U(ci;cj;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H), where U(￿) is country i￿ s utility level
from country i and j￿ s commitment levels and evaluated at the optimal investment level we found
in lemma 1. Note that U(ci;cj;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H) is satis￿ed when ci < ci (cj;m).
Low noncompliance costs. In the strategy pro￿le in which the low type decides to join the
treaty, country i signs the agreement if and only if U(ci;cj;￿L) ￿ U(0;0;￿L) which is true for all
cj > 0. ￿
7.6 Proof of Lemma 5
First, note that in the strategy pro￿le in which both types of country i participate in the agreement
beliefs are ￿(HjS) = p, since posterior beliefs cannot be updated with equilibrium behavior, and
￿(HjNS) 2 [0;1] for any o⁄-the-equilibrium action of ￿not sign￿ . Let us ￿rst analyze country
j￿ s equilibrium responses in this strategy pro￿le, given the above system of beliefs. If country j
observes that country i signs, then country j participates in the treaty if and only if
p ￿ V (ci;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ p ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L)
That is, if p ￿
cj




1 + 2m + mci
1+m
i
￿ log[1 + 2m]
￿
. If country j
observes the (o⁄-the-equilibrium) message in which country i does not sign, then country j responds
by not joining the treaty either, as we showed in lemma 2. Let us now analyze country i when p ￿
cj
cj(ci;m) (and country j participates in the agreement after observing country i signing the treaty). If
country i￿ s noncompliance costs are high, it signs the treaty if and only if U(ci;cj;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H);
that is, if ci ￿ ci (cj;m). In the case that country i￿ s noncompliance costs are low, country i signs
the treaty if and only if U(ci;cj;￿L) ￿ U(0;0;￿L) which is satis￿ed for any parameter values.
Since condition ci ￿ ci (cj;m) and p ￿
cj
cj(ci;m) cannot be simultaneously satis￿ed, the pooling
strategy pro￿le in which both types of country i sign the treaty cannot be supported as a PBEwhen p ￿
cj
cj(ci;m). In the opposite case, when p <
cj
cj(ci;m), we have that country j does not
participate in the international agreement after observing that country i signed the treaty. In
this case country i signs the agreement when its own noncompliance costs are high if and only if
U(ci;0;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H), which induces country i to be indi⁄erent between signing and not signing
the treaty when p <
cj
cj(ci;m). Similarly, if country i￿ s noncompliance costs are low, it participates
in the treaty if and only if U(ci;0;￿L) ￿ U(0;0;￿L), which also implies that country i is indi⁄erent
between signing and not signing the agreement when p <
cj
cj(ci;m). Hence, when p <
cj
cj(ci;m) the
pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types of country i sign the treaty cannot be supported as a
PBE of the game either. ￿
7.7 Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that in the strategy pro￿le in which country i signs the treaty only when its own
noncompliance costs are low, and does not when its noncompliance costs are high. As a consequence,
country j assigns full probability to country i being high after observing that it did not sign the
agreement, ￿(HjNS) = 1, and full probability to country i being low when country i signs the
treaty, ￿(HjS) = 0. Given this system of beliefs, let us now analyze country j￿ s equilibrium















































which is not satis￿ed for any parameter values. Hence, country j does not sign the agreement
after observing that country i participates in the treaty. If in contrast country j observes that
country i does not sign the IEA, we know from Lemma 2 that country j does not participate in
the international agreement, for any parameter values. Let us now focus on country i. When its



















































which holds for any parameter values. Similarly, when country i￿ s noncompliance costs are low,
country i signs the treaty if and only if



















￿which is satis￿ed for any parameter values. ￿
7.8 Proof of Proposition 2
1. Separating where LeaderH signs and LeaderL does not sign. First, note that ￿(HjS) = 1 and
￿(HjNS) = 0. As a consequence, after observing that the leader signs ci = ci > 0, country j
does not participate in the IEA accepting cj = cj > 0 since V (ci;cj;￿H) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H), and
after observing that the leader did not sign , ci = 0, country j does not sign the IEA since
V (0;cj;￿L) ￿ V (0;0;￿L). Regarding the leader, when ￿ = ￿H country i does not participate
in the IEA since U(ci;0;￿H) < U(0;0;￿H), which implies that this strategy pro￿le cannot
be supported as a separating PBE of the game.
2. Separating where LeaderH does not sign and LeaderL signs. First, note that ￿(HjS) = 0
and ￿(HjNS) = 1. As a consequence, after observing that the leader signs ci = ci >
0, country j does not participate in the IEA since V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L), and after
observing that the leader did not sign, country j does not participate in the agreement since
V (0;cj;￿H) ￿ V (0;0;￿H). Regarding the leader, when ￿ = ￿H country i does not participate
in the IEA since U(ci;0;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H). In contrast, when ￿ = ￿L country i signs since
U(ci;0;￿L) ￿ U(0;0;￿L). Hence, this strategy pro￿le can be supported as a separating PBE
of the game.
3. Pooling where both types of leading countries sign. First, note that ￿(HjS) = p and ￿(HjNS) 2
[0;1]. As a consequence, after observing that the leader signs, country j does not sign the
IEA since
p ￿ V (ci;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L) ￿ p ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L)
() p[V (ci;cj;￿H) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H)] ￿ (1 ￿ p)[V (ci;0;￿L) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L)]
since V (ci;cj;￿H) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) and V (ci;0;￿L) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L). And after observing that
the leading country i did not sign, country j does not participate in the IEA given that
￿(HjNS) ￿ V (0;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿(HjNS)) ￿ V (0;cj;￿L)
￿ ￿(HjNS) ￿ V (0;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿(HjNS)) ￿ V (0;0;￿L)
which holds because of V (0;cj;￿H) ￿ V (0;0;￿H) and V (0;0;￿L) ￿ V (0;cj;￿L). Therefore,
country j responds by not participating in the IEA after observing any previous decision by
country i. Regarding the leader, when ￿ = ￿H country i does not sign since U(ci;0;￿H) ￿
U(0;0;￿H). Hence, the strategy pro￿le in which all types of country i sign the agreement
cannot be supported as a pooling PBE of the game.
4. Pooling where both types of leading countries do not sign the IEA. First, note that ￿(HjNS) =
p and ￿(HjS) 2 [0;1]. As a consequence, after observing that the leader signs the treaty,country j does not sign the IEA since
￿(HjS) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿(HjS)) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L)
￿ ￿(HjS) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿(HjS)) ￿ V (ci;0;￿L)
which is satis￿ed because of V (ci;cj;￿H) ￿ V (ci;0;￿H) and V (ci;0;￿L) ￿ V (ci;cj;￿L). Sim-
ilarly, after observing that the leading country i did not sign, country j does not participate
in the IEA given that
p ￿ V (0;cj;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (0;cj;￿L) ￿ p ￿ ￿(0;0;￿H) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ V (0;0;￿L)
p[V (0;cj;￿H) ￿ V (0;0;￿H)] ￿ (1 ￿ p)[V (0;0;￿L) ￿ V (0;cj;￿L)]
since V (0;cj;￿H) ￿ V (0;0;￿H) and V (0;0;￿L) ￿ V (0;cj;￿L). Then, the following country
responds by not participating in the IEA after observing any previous decision from country i.
Regarding the leader, when ￿ = ￿H country i does not sign since U(ci;0;￿H) ￿ U(0;0;￿H),
and when ￿ = ￿L country i is indi⁄erent between signing and not signing the treaty (country
i randomizes) given that U(ci;0;￿L) = U(0;0;￿L). Hence, we can conclude that the strategy
pro￿le in which both types of country i do not sign the agreement cannot be supported as a
pooling PBE in pure strategies. ￿
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